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Preface
Looking over my writing, I have found myself led to a literary criticism that in some
general senses seems to more easily lend itself to the study of genres and aesthetics, than to the
ontological questions about affect. How do those questions, which repeat themselves in my
scattered attempts to read the self in literature, inform my critical interpretations of literary works
and their form? In order to begin to frame the way to ask mythic questions, the questioning itself
necessitates the interpretation of the particularities of writing about the self. How do the
technologies of literature represent and produce the self?
In this search then, I take to heart Jean-Luc Nancy’s recollection of the romance of a
primordial story that “repeats itself indefinitely, with regularity, at every gathering of the hordes,
who come to learn of their tribal origins, of their origins in brotherhoods, in peoples, or in
cities—gathered around fires burning everywhere in the mists of times.”1 It is what the
philosopher conceives of as the myth of that primal myth itself. He instructs us through the
Heideggerian incantation that “with myth, the passing of time takes shape, its ceaseless passing
is fixed in an exemplary place of showing and revealing.”2As I write, I remember walking away
from the smolder of a beach-fire, a place of sharing. Turning to look back on that light it was
suddenly unfamiliar, set against the inclement deep darkness of a seascape that barely
distinguished itself from the sky.
❦

1

Jean-Luc Nancy, “Myth Interrupted” in The Inoperative Community, trans. Peter Connor (Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 44.
2
Nancy, 45.
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Introduction
…in self-depreciation, in whining hypocritical repentance and in a mere passive state of mind—
these are not compatible with any frame of mind that can be counted beautiful, still less with one
which is to be counted sublime.
—Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment
If this paper takes one idea as its starting point, it is Martin Heidegger’s statement in Being
and Time that “prior to all psychology of moods, a field which, moreover, still lies fallow, we
must see this phenomenon as a fundamental existential and outline its structure.”3 The
philosopher’s phenomenological approach to mood stands in contrast to the psychological.
Heidegger contends that mood must actually be thought as something more than an internal
mental state. Speaking broadly, psychodynamic approaches to that nebulous notion of “moods”
find origin in the categorization of the disorders afflicting the self in order to produce a
conceptual framework and scientific knowledge of the human mind. In the production of this
knowledge for ultimately therapeutic means, thinking about feelings in terms of the
psychological has the ideological consequence of construing affects as neurosis in the
construction of the anxious modern subject.
The field that makes up the psychology of moods seems less “fallow” however, as recent
critical study has taken up “affect” as a key field of inquiry. Frederic Jameson produced the
contentious theoretical assertion of what he famously called the “waning of affect”4; in
postmodernity, and under the material conditions of late-capitalism, the representation of stable
subjects and their emotions has given way to works of art reliant on the production of what
3

Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010),
130.
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Lyotard called “intensities.” This periodizing thesis has indeed become the grounds of refutation
for the instatement of affect as a critical tool and the basis for a larger theoretical project. In
Feeling in Theory, Rei Terada determines that “Jameson memorably phrases what many people
have suspected that there is some kind of contradiction in attributing emotion, or at least strong
and clear emotion, to anything other than a subject. Emotion and subjectivity seem to be deeply
connected.”5 She claims however, that the advent of poststructuralism (rather than a mere
disaffected postmodernism) provides a theoretical model for thinking affect in spite of the notion
that “a discourse and ideology of emotion exist; that poststructuralist theory shows their relation;
and that the effect of this exploration is to suggest that we would have no emotions if we were
subjects.”6 My research intersects with the work of Terada specifically in this assertion that
feelings understand the imposition that is subjectivity; the interpretation of affect itself
necessarily calls for a deconstruction of the subject.7
The novel, as the staging of bourgeois subjectivity turned anxious in modernity, becomes
the theatre of my argument8. This paper takes as its task the investigation—not of the status of
emotion following the dissolution of the anxious subject of modernity—but the possibility of
understanding literature of the anxious self as already radically alternate to its formulation
through a bourgeois subject extant in some version of modernity, now nostalgically past. Rather
than re-affirming this logic of supersession, I call for a re-invigorated attempt at reading an

4

Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late-Capitalism (Durham: Duke University Press,
1991), 10.
5
Rei Terada, Feeling in Theory: Affect after the Death of the Subject (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,2001),
2.
6
Terada, 4.
7
Related theories—although not necessarily specifically grounded in the address of poststructuralism—found in the
work of Lauren Berlant, Brian Massumi and Sianne Ngai, and others seek to address how affect can and cannot be
restored, or at least thought as critical tools that figure as disruptive of discourse, literature, politics and the limits of
what constitutes theory itself.
8
See Frederic Jameson, The Antinomies of Realism (Brooklyn: Verso, 2013), which I discuss at more length later
on, for further explication of the relationship between the realist novel and the bourgeois subject.
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understanding of anxiety that falls outside the enforced logic of anxious modernity as such,
starting with the imposition of Heidegger’s fundamental ontological departures from the subject.
I have selected two modern literary works that exemplify distinct approaches to the
depiction of the self: Osamu Dazai’s work Ningen Shikkaku (also known by its English title, No
Longer Human) and Iris Murdoch’s novel The Sea, The Sea. They both depict the self through
the first-person writings of a self-conscious narrator. These works relate obliquely to the canon
of modern literature of the modern novel and the high modernist avant-garde. While their
selection as the subject of this research may seem historically or culturally disparate it is through
the both their distinct representations of a peculiarly modern anxiety and through a shared
tendency towards a tradition of pathologizing interpretation as a literary strategy of subjection
that they come into relation.
Ningen Shikkaku was published in Japan in 1948, just after the end of the Second World. In
the context of the question is Japan modern? the work has attained a contested literary status.
While contemporaneous Japanese criticism shunned other so-called “‘I’-novels” as low-literary
or not living up to a Western literary aesthetic, Ningen Shikkaku now figures as a major modern
literary work that signifies Japanese literature’s “achievement” of modernity through its
representation of a self plagued by suicidal anxiety. In its famous depiction of anxiety, I want to
re-read the narrator’s self-reflection not as the ultimate example of the modern anomie that
threatens and affirms subjectivity, but as also opening up possibilities for investigation in the
text’s refusals: both its narrator’s strange failure to understand himself as a human, and the text’s
formal resistance to categorization as a novel.
Iris Murdoch’s novel The Sea, The Sea contrasts with Dazai’s work in its anachronistic
appeal to the realist novel par-excellence. Published in 1978 as Murdoch’s 20 novel, the work
th
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received the prestigious Booker Prize, representing its highly successful assimilation into the
discourse of the novel’s readership. Unlike Dazai’s work, its oblique relationship to modernity
comes from its ultimate lack of, and refusal to engage with modern and postmodern vanguardist
aesthetics. It exemplifies a conservative relationship to literature in its approbation of the tactics
of the realist novel and its notion of the subject. Narrated by the pompous musings of the retired
stage director Charles Arrowby setting out to write his memoirs, the theatre of it “staging”
becomes a key term in this paper for an interpretation of the uncanny that must be read radically
in its anxieties.
The reinterpretation of modern literature and its contingent relationship to the so-called
‘age of anxiety’ has important consequences for a staging of the self that takes shape in literary
studies. The interpretation of modern literature has become mutually constitutive with a
psychological framework for interpretation. One basis of this interpretive discourse appears
historiographically through the periodization of modernity apprehended in the term pathological
notion of “anxiety” and its reliance on literary self-reflection. For Kant and the discourse of
aesthetics thereafter, the consideration of art (including literature, poetry having priority)
appeared as a special class of objects with a unique relationship to subjectivity. Rather than a
Kantian subject of aesthetic judgment aspiring to pleasure, beauty, and the sublime, the modern
individual can be defined for Freud through the neurotic projection of negative affects that
describe its agonistic consciousness and relationship to the world.9 This ubiquitous and

9

I hope to show generally the relationship between Kant and Freud’s strategies of subjection as they relate to the
discourse of aesthetics itself. Freud makes representation in artworks evidence, which aside from art historical event
of surrealism finds expression in his analysis of “The Uncanny” in literature, which I hold at arms length through
this paper: “As good as nothing is to be found upon this subject in comprehensive treatises on aesthetics, which in
general prefer to concern themselves with what is beautiful, attractive and sublime—that is, with feelings of a
positive nature—and with the circumstances and the objects that call them forth, rather than with the opposite
feelings of distress and repulsion.” Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny” in The Complete Psychological Works of
Sigmund Freud, trans. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1955), 219.
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seemingly natural drama of the self necessitates the ideological imposition of bourgeois
subjectivity, more broadly reinforced through a tradition inherited from the enlightenment’s
paradigmatic institution of the subject and the object as the fundamental organizing feature of
aesthetics itself.
In the first section, “The Sea in Dazai,” the textual representation of the sea in Ningen
Shikkaku figures as a departure from other aesthetic configurations of the relationship between
landscape and the self. The sea figures as site for an aesthetic of failed or limited capacities of
representation, illustrating the affective significance of a disqualified self in terms of an antisublime ontological appeal to anxiety. While continuing the explication of disqualification as it is
represented affectively, the second section, “Ningen Shikkaku, Suicide, and Shishōsetsu”
considers Dazai’s text both in terms of the interpretive precedents for the highly specific
Japanese literary form known as shishōsetsu, and the discourse of suicidal narrative in Japan.
The third section, “Painting an Anxious Sea,” further defines the articulation of an affective
dimension of aesthetics in both The Sea, The Sea and Ningen Shikkaku through a comparison of
the works’ literary investment in the metaphor of painting and their incorporation of ekphrasis. I
also examine the ekphrastic element in Heidegger’s text “The Origin of the Work of Art.” In
addition, the ideological implications of realism as defined through Jameson’s text The
Antinomies of Realism serves as a framework for understanding the strategies employed in the
representation of the self in relationship to the bourgeois subject in both works. The final section,
titled “The Sea in Murdoch” analyzes the depiction of the seascape in the text in relationship to
Murdoch’s investments in realism and her distrust of modernism. As both the revelation of the
fictional memoir’s artifice, and the basis for the retrospective construction of a neurotic subject,
this section advances the claim that reading for anxiety exposes “staging” as a key term for

9

understanding the formal function of affect in the text. Reading Heidegger’s terminology of
“thrownness” and “attunement” against the representation of affect in The Sea, The Sea, allows
for an understanding of the novel’s investment in a psychoanalytic subject amenable to the moral
judgments of realist aesthetics, while suggesting the radical possibility of reading against the
interpretive and intentional constructions of subjectivity that frame the novel.
At stake in the interpretation of these works are the politics not only of mood, but also of
representation itself. The texts exemplify, through their contradictory positions at either end of a
post-war period, an age already understood anxiously, and apprehend their version of modernity
retrospectively. In the work Ugly Feelings, Sianne Ngai investigates affects minor to the
Enlightenment tradition of aesthetic inquiry. Acknowledging its “centrality across periods and
knowledge formations (literature, literary culture, philosophy, psychoanalysis),” she asks, “how
does anxiety come to acquire its special status in Western culture as the distinctive ‘feeling-tone’
of intellectual inquiry itself.”10 Engaging these two novels in relation to one another allows for a
critical apprehension of anxiety as it affects a self quite different from an ontology and aesthetics
of modernity structured by psychoanalytic consolidation of anxiety into the conservative
pathology of the subject. I will show that it is not through sublime revelation or beautiful
recollection, but through their anxious orientation that these texts reveal an affected self, as
phenomena other than the inherited concept of bourgeois subjectivity.

The Sea in Dazai
Waves of anxiety crash, rising and falling only to be reformulated into an opaque textual
sea, without revelation or depth. What is certain about Ningen Shikkaku is neither the

10

Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 215.
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orientalist’s peaceful meditation nor the pathological raving of a suicidal maniac. The alienness
of the introspective prose commands a striking realism of sorts. Reading the work itself is to
subject oneself to the peculiarly dreadful, unmitigated by any mystical revelation or pleasure in
the beauty of things. Its narrator indeed seems disqualified from the type of “humanness” that
might craft the images adorning a delicate screen, or the poetic representations that figure in the
waka and hokku harkening back to the lilting genteel of Heian Japan.
However, the depiction of blue waves glinting in springtime, draws attention. It seems
innocent of his suicidal abjection. In this brief refrain from introspection, Yozo seems
identifiable as an artist, a young man aspiring to be painter, capable of eschewing momentarily
his course of self-examination fraught with dread to create beauty in recording his perceptions of
the sea:
On the shore, at a point so close to the ocean one might imagine it was there that the
waves broke, stood a row of over twenty fairly tall cherry trees with coal-black trunks.
Every April when the new school year was about to begin these trees would display their
dazzling blossoms and their moist brown leaves against the blue of the sea. Soon a
snowstorm of blossoms would scatter innumerable petals into the water, flecking the
surface with points of white which the waves carried back to the shore. This beach strewn
with cherry blossoms served as the playground of the high school I attended. Stylized
cherry blossoms flowered even on the badge of the regulation school cap and on the
buttons of our uniforms.11
This is a primal moment, the depiction of a view of the seascape. The writer’s attempt to capture
in language the object of perception. This image of the sea, if interpreted as un-anxiously
decorative in its poetry, would stand alone as such in No Longer Human. Is this passage—which
marks Yozo’s departure from his parent’s household, and the beginning of his coming of age—a
glimpse of the narrator’s pleasure in remembering the sea of his youth, and of an otherwise
impossible pleasure in being Human?

11

Dazai Osamu, No Longer Human, trans. Donald Keane (New York, NY: New Directions, 1958), 41-42.
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Like the cherry blossom design sewn into the school uniforms, this passage from the
beginning of Oba Yozo’s second notebook seems to be a stylized kernel of beauty, an object of
aesthetical reflection. It is stitched into Yozo’s memory, written in his notebook, and it will haunt
Yozo as he continues to write. The simple landscape in the memory of Yozo’s childhood, this
impression of the seashore, functions within Ningen Shikkaku not only as some sort of realization
of the pleasure of nature’s beauty; but in its exceptionality already resonates as it rhymes with
that cold water into which Yozo and his lover will throw themselves. The narrative will never
break free from the logic of disqualification, which makes the depiction of the view outside of
Yozo’s self impossible, his being constituted through anxiety as a state of abjection.
In the passage quoted above, Keane renders Dazai’s writing in translation as a unified
poetic image. Yozo looks through the sakura trees. He describes their blooming along with the
changing season, setting it against the timeless breaking of waves. Reading this as a Japanese
“novel,” the decadent and artful depiction seems indicative of the season, as a sort of establishing
image, references a long literary and art historical tradition of natural imagery. Many students of
the Japanese language will recognize the customary epistolary practice of beginning even an
informal note with a seasonal reference to nature. In this act of transcribing his perception of the
landscape, it is even fruitful to think of Yozo momentarily like Basho. Recall the father of the
haiku at the seashore in his work Oku no Hosomichi also looking upon or remembering a
particular landscape and composing hokku:
Turbulent the sea—
Across to Sado stretches
The Milky Way. 12

12

Bashō Matsuo, The Narrow Road to Oku, trans. Keane (New York: Kodansha America, 1996), 127.
12

In Basho’s hokku, or any version of the unavoidably iconic print Wave by Hiroshige, it is the
unpredictable danger of a rough sea, and its representation as a perfected work of craftsmanship,
which is notable. In Hiroshige’s print, the line of sight, extending towards Mt. Fuji as the focal
point of the series Thirty Six Views of Mt. Fuji, is obstructed literally and compositionally by the
imposing wave. The sea that surrounds the islands of Japan—and from which, according to the
Shinto creation myth, the gods raised the land of Japan—is at once the aesthetic object of
pleasure and an imposing subject, an obstacle and a barrier made permeable.
Basho’s hokku verse folds around the particle “や” which has been translated (I chose
Keane’s translation) as an em-dash at the end of the first line. This particle structures the
comparison between the sea and the night sky. It acts as hinge through which a sublime “motion”
(to use Kant’s terminology) modifies the specificity of the sea as it “stretches” and transforms
poetically to incomprehensible celestial magnitudes. Ama no gawa, translated as “The Milky
Way” also translates more literally as “heaven’s river.” The torrent of the sea obstructs the
island of Sado, prominent in the Japanese historical imaginary as a place of banishment and
exile. The metaphor that exceeds reality in this form of poetry and provides my brief closereading with its most fundamental thrust reveals the radically contrasting way the representation
of the sea figures in Ningen Shikkaku.13
Unlike Basho—whose work composes and coalesces these poetic essences of places,
whose meditation becomes and is activated by this textuality of hokku—Yozo’s observation
betrays innocence and not mastery. Dazai writes a narrator who lacks the ability to transcribe his
perception so that it may becomes this sort of enigmatic and ideal sublime, implicating the
13

I do not mean to compare Dazai and Basho in order to assert that the the sea in Dazai is surprisingly calm, with its
cherry blossom petals falling on a bright blue day, the small peaks of waves glinting in the sunlight of his
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anxiety of writing itself as an aesthetic object. In the original text of Ningen Shikkaku, the
Japanese, while equally poetic, betrays a feeling of immediacy of an anxious present. Dazai
renders in the text the process of perceiving and remembering through a desperation in Yozo’s
writing in a way that the translation cannot quite. Instead of Keane’s five sentences, each
containing a new idea, the view of the sea comprises a single sentence. This sentence is
punctuated with commas into a fragmented set of clauses. I have translated it in attempt to
maintain that structure so it reads as follows:
At the sea—where the waves break, you could say it was that close to the shore, wild
sakura trees with pitch black bark, about twenty fairly large ones stood there—when the
new school year is about to start, the wild sakura, their new leaves sticky and brown, set
against the background of the blue sea, there the dazzling blossoms open, and then, when
the blossoms fall in opulence, innumerable petals scatter into the ocean, sprinkling the
surface and floating, the breaking waves carry them back to the water’s edge, it was that
beach with those cherry blossoms, which served as the schoolyard…14
The repetition of the demonstrative pronoun “sono” which I have translated as “there the
dazzling…”, “it was that beach”, “those cherry blossoms” reflects Yozo’s attempts to locate and
describe his perceptions, to get it down. In this way, the text implicates the act writing, with
Yozo as writer, and his failure to delineate the scene in such a way so as to vanish the self
completely.15
Basho’s Oku no Hosomichi however, still reflects the viewpoint of the bard, the poet
whose self is transcended in order to present to an audience the intoxication of profound and
arbitrated wisdom. While I cannot and do not intend to investigate the many differences between

remembered youth. Rather I hope to better understand how the usage of the sea Dazai specifically differs from the
literary function of this particle in Basho as a method of comparison and sublimity.
14
Dazai Osamu, Ningen Shikkaku (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, Shōwa 54, 1979), 113. My translation.
15
It might be that Keane opted for a more legible sentence structure in order to avoid comparisons to stream-ofconsciousness writing or other recognizable textual experiments of modernism. Japanese accommodates sentences
like this readily, often omitting subjects that might be implied, and incorporating multiple clauses. While I wouldn’t
argue that this is an experimental style, it does read as colloquial. Furthermore, it is worth noting that this type of
sentence structure is not uncommon within the work.
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the role of Haibun in Japanese literature and Western or other bardic traditions, I read Dazai’s
work set in relief to a propositional notion of Basho’s works as constituting a very different
relationship to selfhood. As indicated in “Oku no Hosomichi,” the title of Basho’s haibun,
through the pun of “interior” and the wilderness of the “deep north” (oku), Basho transcends the
self through a writing of the “interior.” The poesis of the hokku seems to rely on this
achievement of self-realization. On the inheritance of this notion of the self in shishōsetsu, the
peculiar genre of modern Japanese literature, which Ningen Shikkaku emerges from, the scholar
of Japanese literature Edward Fowler writes that
the achievement of selfhood in the Japanese context, then, means in a very positive sense
the loss of one’s individuality. This is a recurrent theme in many shishōsetsu but most
conspicuously in those of Shiga Naoya, whose “Kinosaki nite” (At Kinosaki) and An’ya
Kōro (A dark night’s passing) are particularly powerful depictions of the authorial
persona’s communion with nature and of what the early twentieth-century philosopher
Nishida Kitarō calls “emptying the self,” achieved by the perceiving subject’s
identification with the object.16
While I will return to a closer analysis of Ningen Shikkaku’s place within the genre form of
shishōsetsu with specific attention in the next section of this paper, it suffices to say that it is
precisely its difference from this notion of the self that distinguishes Dazai’s work. Yozo does
not make a literary comparison in the attempt to write a poem, and does not attempt to commune
with nature, seeming rather distant from the Zen aesthetic project of “identification with the
object.” He lacks the ability to transcribe the sea or its being as some kind of aesthetic object,
resisting or failing the enigmatic terms of hokku. Identification as a possibility of “communion”
is an impossibility for Yozo. The anxiety that inflects this representation of the sea, as the
disclosure of the failed possibility of communion defines the disqualification of the self in
Dazai’s work.
16

Edward Fowler, The Rhetoric of Confession: Shishōsetsu in Early Twentieth-Century Japanese Fiction (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1988), 14.

15

In this passage Yozo attempts to transcribe a perception of the sea. As a description of the
landscape, the sea figures in the work as a prop, a painted screen, and a set piece. But as the term
landscape already suggests, it is also something outside the self, which surrounds. In the passage
from Ningen Shikkaku above—where I argue that Yozo expresses at once an inability to
constitute the sea completely, and an innocent, or at least youthful viewpoint—the confused
action of transcribing the observation of the scene contrasts peculiarly with the calm spring
weather, and the casual breaking of waves that carries the delicate and abundant springtime
blossoms. Unlike Basho’s, this landscape, the sea, derives its significance not from Yozo’s
being, but from its own system of interactions and temporal relationships: the season and its
weather, the wind which strikes and carries each petal, the position of the sakura above the
water. These relationships form a system revealed through the very inability of the text to
represent them, a literary impulse that shows itself and the truth of being through its own brokenness: a revelation not of the sublime, but a critique of the ideological claim that representation
makes to the epistemological in modern literary realism.17 I am continually inspired and
instructed as I work through understanding of the sea as it functions in the paradox of
“landscape” (and in its relationship to the—as yet insufficiently articulated—primary role of the
“self”) by Eve Sedgwick’s reading of Proust, which works against the many rich
psychoanalytically determined readings of À la recherche du temps perdu:
Surprise is the mark of reality, insofar as what is real—what surrounds the subject, the
weather of the world—has to exceed the will of the subject, including its will to arrive at
truth. At the same time, surprise with its promise of an ever-refreshed internal world is
the mark not only of reality, but of the mystical orientation that allows Proust to cherish
that reality. It’s in this context that one might compare Proust’s love of the weather with
17

I am indebted in my language to Frederic Jameson’s work The Antinomies of Realism, which figures prominently
in the later section of this paper entitled “Painting an Anxious Sea.” He asserts that “Realism, as I argued elsewhere,
is a hybrid concept, in which an epistemological claim (for knowledge or truth) masquerades as an aesthetic ideal,
with fatal consequences for both of these incommensurable dimensions.” Frederic Jameson, The Antinomies of
Realism (Brooklyn: Verso, 2013) 5-6.
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the more overtly philosophical amor fati, the love of fate or necessity, that Nietzsche
desclared to represent his own “inmost nature.”18
Despite its decontextualized presentation here, this analysis of Proust brings into relief several
important differences that characterize Ningen Shikkaku. In the passage from Dazai, the sea does
exceed the will of the subject and its actions are cherished in their delicacy and abundance.
However, the relationship between that Nietzschean affirmation of that which is outside of the
will of the subject encounters a curious play in Dazai’s work.
Yozo cannot will it into text, and the ultimate apprehension of the sea’s reality is Dazai’s
failure to “mark” it. This coincides with Fowler’s characterization of the shishōsetsu’s author,
who “rather than attempt to create a fictional world that transcended his immediate
circumstances, he sought to transcribe the world as he had experienced it, with little concern for
overall narrative design” and who “compiled this record less out of a sense of his own selfimportance than out of skepticism that experience other than his own could be recorded with
complete confidence.”19 In this interpretation, Yozo’s presentation of the sea, contrasts with the
ideal of a poetic representation organized by the epistemological gathering together of an
omniscient author-function. Instead I read Ningen Shikkaku in its concern with a (de)constitution of the self as a realism of a different sort, invoking the epistemological only as it
must always remain limited. The ontological promise which characterizes Proustian novelistic
weather in its ability to surprise the subject contrasts with a sea that cannot be described unless
through that ultimate expression of will, suicide. Yozo’s youthful description of the sea, already
haunted by the suicidal narration of Ningen Shikkaku, becomes the landscape against which
Dazai writes the anxious self, forever banished, disqualified by the turbulent suicidal sea, on that

18
19

Sedgwick, Eve. “The Weather in Proust” in The Weather in Proust. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 34.
Fowler, The Rhetoric of Confession, xxiii-xxiv.
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island of Sado. This point begins to articulate the role of the self in Dazai’s text as oriented in the
world through an anxious alienness that cannot “cherish reality.” And yet, the writing of the self
in Ningen Shikkaku cannot be reduced to the modern alienated individual whose eschatological
anxiety stands at one end of a history begun by the stable bourgeois subject.
In Ningen Shikkaku the sea itself figures in many ways and comes in many waves. The sea
in Dazai should not be read in terms of any radical departure from either “traditional” Japanese
depictions of the sea, or precedents of inflecting the sea with a certain mood. Instead, by reading
Dazai’s varied preoccupations with the sea, I articulate a positioning of the self that represents
the sea in Ningen Shikkaku, in its liminality, characterized by oblique and negative relationships
to both Western and Japanese notions of the self, that allow me to read Dazai’s text as producing
an ontology of anxiety.

Ningen Shikkaku, Suicide, and Shishōsetsu
This investigation risks a reading of the status of the self in Ningen Shikkaku as a horizon
for an understanding of affect as critical of subjectivity. This necessitates inquiry into the status
of the work’s relationship to the Western notion of the novel form and its conventions of
interpretation, in addition to the specific concerns regarding autobiographical literature. Three
fictional “notebooks” written by the character Oba Yozo, together with a short epilogue and
prologue narrated by someone who finds the notebooks at a later date, make up the work. The
notebooks, as Yozo’s diaries, are a work of fiction. However, their resemblance to Dazai’s own
biography, and more importantly, Ningen Shikkaku’s reception within the tradition of the
shishōsetsu, or “I-novel,” complicate the notion of the fictive as it relates to an understanding of
the autobiography’s non-fictive claims.
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Read as autobiography, Ningen Shikkaku could be understood through the fetishized
psychological state Dazai himself, and as a product of the cultural context that a historical
reading of the work would set him against. The author would function in this way as emblematic
of modernity; the work would serve as a memorialization of the decadent, suicidal soul of the
artist set against the backdrop of postwar Japanese defeat, shame, violence, and chaos. In this
way, Yozo’s confessions serve to exemplify Dazai’s own significance as experiencing the event
of “no longer” being able to be “human,” and the anxious tonalities of the work read as
symptomatic. Without invalidating the possibility of such a reading, I instead assert a reading of
the work through its vexed relationships to autobiography and any stable Western notion of the
self achieved through an ideological investment in the subject, with specific attention to the
hermeneutic context of the literary genre of shishōsetsu. From this critical position emerges an
analysis of the very terms of suicidal “disqualification” in the self-conscious investigation of
human being that—in addition to being readable in terms of the realities of the pop-cultural and
literary edification of Dazai’s biography—represents anxiety as fundamental to being in the
world.

Disqualified Being
While the title given to the work by its English translator Donald Keene is No Longer
Human, looking at the original Japanese—Ningen Shikkaku (人間失格)--illustrates the various
interpretative possibilities not necessarily evident in the English. Ningen (人間) is translated as
“human,” not in the biological sense, but in the sense of human being. Shikkaku (失格), which is
translated by the scholar of Japanese literature Donald Keene as “No longer,” might be more
literally translated as “Disqualified,” making the title of Dazai’s novel “Disqualified Human.”
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This betrays the reason Keene used “no longer human” as the title. In addition to being less
awkward, it creates a grammar of temporality, which “Disqualified,” despite being in the past
tense, does not. But why not translate it as “Disqualified [as]/[from being] Human?” The almost
juridical notion of disqualification seems to suggest something different than the sense of loss
inspired in “no longer” being human. Keene’s title alludes to Dazai’s biographical narrative, and
the historical context of post-war Japan as defined by feelings of extreme loss and lack. In this
way, the two possible titles open onto two different readings of the novel. Without negating
Keane’s interpretation, but looking instead to the notion of disqualification as a state of human
being, Dazai’s work evokes a question about the meaning of being as a literary possibility.
More than sensory experiences, imagery, or even its plot, the work is heavily comprised of
passages, which detail Yozo’s interpretation of his state of being. After moving to Tokyo to
study painting, Yozo’s art school dilettante friend Horiki takes him to a Marxist reading group in
Tokyo. Much of the narrative prior to Yozo’s first suicide attempt follows his engagement with
this radical political community. Despite eventually becoming an integral member of the Party,
he knows from the start that the logic of Marxian economics and historical materialism—their
agreeable system of theorization—do not fully encompass the fundamental ontological condition
of humanity. He describes his first meeting, recalling
a lecture on Marxian economics delivered by an extraordinarily ugly young man, the
guest of honor. Everything he said seemed exceedingly obvious, and undoubtedly true,
but I felt sure that something more obscure, more frightening lurked in the hearts of
human beings. Greed did not cover it, nor did vanity. Nor was it simply a combination of
lust and greed. I wasn’t sure what it was, but I felt that there was something inexplicable
at the bottom of human society which was not reducible to economics. Terrified as I was
by this weird element, I assented to materialism as naturally as water finding its own
level. But materialism could not free me from my dread of human beings; I could not feel
the joy of hope a man experiences when he opens his eyes on young leaves.20
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In his agreement with the explanations provided by Marxism, he recognizes also that which
exceeds its explanation. This recognition is described through an affective knowledge of
something inexplicable, registered as fear. Not fear of an unknown or the unknowable, but the
very knowledge acquired through the experience of what he calls “this weird element.”
The comfort he takes in his involvement with the community of Marxist political radicals
derives not from any political ideals or radical intention, both of which involve an investment
that because of his fundamental disqualification from human being he cannot indulge. He
recounts how he found it “uproariously amusing to see [his] ‘comrades,’” their faces tense as
though they were discussing matters of life and death, absorbed the study of theories so
elementary they were on the order of ‘one and one makes two.’”21 Despite their acceptance of
him as a jovial presence, and tasking him with important obligations, Yozo’s outward
identification with the community he encounters as his “comrades” never becomes a true or
authentic identification in his own words. “Comrade” itself is written in quotation marks. Yozo is
always already unable to overcome his own alienness.
This alienness does not refer to alienation as such, where the stable subject no longer finds
individual fulfillment (as in the “anomie” articulated in the sociology of Emile Durkheim, or,
more pertinently, the alienation described as a function of capitalism by Karl Marx). Rather,
Ningen Shikkaku articulates alienness through an anxiety that upsets the possibility of the assent
to the “human” sphere. He refers to being agreeable to Marxian analysis as the natural and
always occurring process of “water finding its own level.” Such gravity of purpose— the
possibility of teleological resolution in a theory of materialism—elicits the anticipation of its
disruption by something frightening and still unexplained that causes his feeling of alienness.
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When Yozo writes that he “cannot feel the joy of hope a man experiences when he opens his
eyes on young leaves,” the image evokes an immediate intertextual retrospection involving the
image of the sea that decorates the beginning of the second notebook, where he observed and
transcribed “the wild sakura, their spring leaves sticky and brown.”22 In level water, Yozo’s
reflection elicits an uncanny23 feeling “at the bottom” that makes such springtime hopefulness
the very material of his dis-identification, articulated as his “dread of human beings.”
In addition to the conflicted representation of landscape and the attendant aesthetic and
affective questions in Ningen Shikkaku, the sea serves in Yozo’s writing as a metaphor for the
possibility of escape from the unending dread that he feels in his state of disqualification. Further
examining his relationship to the Marxist reading group he says he attends “because I liked to,”24
the sardonic tone of such an affirmation is disrupted by a more confusing realization about his
part in the group, going beyond “any common affection derived from Marx”25 to something
more basic:
Irrationality. I found the thought faintly pleasurable. Or rather, I felt at ease with it. What
frightened me was the logic of the world; in it lay the foretaste of something incalculably
powerful. Its mechanism was incomprehensible, and I could not possibly remain
closeted` in that windowless, bone-chilling room. Though outside lay the sea of
irrationality, it was far more agreeable to swim in its waters until presently I drowned.26
Something named “irrationality” calls to Yozo as the “faintly pleasurable” logic of these illicit
meetings, an escape from the more dreadful “logic of the world.” Keane translates the Japanese
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word higōhō exceptionally as “irrationality.” Like his translation of the title Ningen Shikkaku,
itself he avoids juridical connotations. Here however, it is not just connotation. The word higōhō
means quite literally, illicit and unlawful activities27 or those unlawfully engaged. Similarly, the
word that carries over in Keane’s translation as “logic” in Dazai’s text is the word gōhō. Higōhō
is merely the word gōhō with the addition of the prefix having the characteristics of “un-” or
“non-.” This creates a distinct binary between Yozo’s sense of the “faintly pleasurable” unlawful
or illicit aspect of the reading group and its radical ideas, and the lawful or licit aspect of “the
world.” This “world” he compares through metaphor to a sense of a “windowless” and “bonechilling” confinement refers to the world of human society.
The sense of this whole quotation is strangely confused when the comparison of
‘irrationality’ (unlawful, illicit) and ‘logic’ (lawful, licit). The “irrationality” which referred to
his reflections on his participation in the Marxist meeting group, extends to something much
larger in the metaphor of a “sea of irrationality.” Furthermore, the notion of mystery confuses the
sense of these lines. Mystery is attributed to the logic by which the world functions, its
“incomprehensible mechanism”, but also seems present in this idea of “irrationality” that which
is outside. The anxiety in the confusion of this binary belies the notion of a “disqualified”
human. As alien, Yozo perceives more mystery in the notion of a world from which he is always
apart, itself a mysterious, or at least dreadful sentiment. Yozo portrays himself not as disqualified
tout court, but trapped in a foreboding apparatus or logic he represents as a foreign law
apprehended through fear rather sense. The pleasure he associates with Marxism, and the
Marxist community’s “irrationality” is also limited as a methodone-fix for the anxiety that
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circumscribes Yozo’s self. The pathologizable vectors of Yozo’s dreads and fears are therefore
underwritten by a deeper sense of anxiety.
What Keane renders through translation as, “more agreeable to swim in its waters until
presently I drowned,” suggests a certain ‘irrational’ passivity, where the original text extends to
this statement the same agency that accompanies the rest of the first-person introspection. It
might be better translated to retain this intentionality as the frightening sentiment, “I cannot stay
seated in the penetrating chill of its room, it is without a window, but outside there is the
preferable sea of unlawfulness, into which I would rather dive and swim, to finally meet my
death, at ease.”28 Despite Keane’s translation, and a tradition, which would undermine suicide as
an “irrational” act, Yozo articulates a sense of the pleasure in the unlawful as a term in his own
writing, rather than merely being an “irrational” character. He asserts that there is a pleasure that
might attenuate the affective dissonance that characterizes his state of disqualification. It would
derive from the act of total disqualification itself, that teleological potential for final resolution in
suicide.29

The Terms of Suicidal Narrative and Shishōsetsu
Suicide is the destruction of the self. It is in this way that I want to reinvigorate Ningen
Shikkaku’s classification as shishōsetsu. Its difference from Western literary convention is its
suicidal confession. Fowler writes that the form “as confession, pales before its western
28
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counterpart…confession in the interest of atonement or self-analysis or even self aggrandizement
is the catalyst for some resolution or action that gives the work its shape and direction. In short,
fiction and autobiography in the west have as one of their formal properties a sense of forward
movement and purpose.”30 Ningen Shikkaku, true to Fowler’s analysis, does not respond to
modernity with any sort of revelatory mode, its anxiety is not that of Bataille… It does not attain
its movement and purpose through a teleological sense of arriving at death. Suicide works as an
interruption, and the imposition of anxious self-consciousness.
In Edward Fowler’s account of the hermeneutics of shishōsetsu in The Rhetoric of
Confession, he argues that both the form itself, and the practice of its reading, differ essentially
from the novel (whose multiplicity of forms he admittedly collapses for rhetorical purpose). The
modern novel in Western literary convention is treated as an autonomous work—the most pure
novels judged as such by their ability to reach an autonomous state (he uses the examples of
Flaubert or Joyce). To the contrary, he writes that the shishōsetsu’s “meaning derives from an
extraliterary source, namely, the author’s life… see[ing] the work as meaningful only insofar as
it illuminates the life. The Japanese reader constructs a “sign” out of the signifying text and the
signified extraliterary life, with no misgivings about this apparent blending of “intrinsic” literary
and “extrinsic” biographical data.”31 Fowler’s work convincingly argues that despite this
popular tradition of interpretation, the genre already opens up possibilities beyond its
consideration as an artifact or as an aspect of the author’s life. However, he warns that to call this
shishōsetsu fiction, is to construct the binary distinction with non-fiction (and specifically
autobiography) to a genre which already evades that opposition in its emergence from a Japanese
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tradition.32 I have spilled the ink of introducing Fowler’s characterization of shishōsetsu to say
that the degree to which Ningen Shikkaku is “representative” of the form is contentious. In terms
of periodization, it was published in 1948, after the height of shishōsetsu as a pop-cultural form,
during the Taisho Period. Fowler explains that after that period, work in the genre of shishōsetsu
is often considered to have “undergone a transformation…variously described as a
“fictionalizing” or “distorting” of the form.” Nishida Masayoshi, a Japanese medievalist who, at
the time, was one of the only non-European critics examining shishōsetsu as a form, asserts this
decline in Dazai’s work pejoratively as “nihilistic.”33
Unlike the “novel” and the autobiography, whose subject is realized in its movement
towards revelation and death, that moment when it all must end, Yozo confesses that he and his
momentary lover “threw [them]selves into the sea at Kamakura that night.”34 It is not a
revelation but a record. Yozo survives, and explains in an uneasily plain tone how “she untied
her sash, saying she had borrowed it from a friend at the café, and left it folded neatly on a rock.
I removed my coat and put in the same spot. We entered the water together.” Yozo must
continue living, towards suicide, towards the sea. Ningen Shikkaku, while inescapable tied to the
life of Dazai Osamu, also writes an anxious notion of Human Being, where Being is always its
disqualification, Yozo does not become disqualified from Human Being, but considers himself to
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have been from the start, he does not die, but always already lives in this orientation towards
suicide. The confessional mode of Dazai’s work, rather than propelling the narrative in a
revelatory forward movement, orients the work as an anxious account of Being.
At the same time that the complex orientalist and Japanese constructions of a national
images of suicide from seppuku to kamikaze appropriate Dazai’s suicide, Alan Wolfe asserts in
Suicidal Narrative in Modern Japan that Dazai’s texts “reveal what might now be termed a
‘deconstructive edge’ in that his posthumous status as a monument of negativity is already
perceived and undone in his autobiographical narratives of suicide.”35 The subject of Dazai
Osamu’s work, Ningen Shikkaku, is the failure of Oba Yozo, constituted by anxiety. Yozo is selfisolated by the idea that he was born irreconcilably alienated from society, consistently repeating
over and over his inability to become human. He reflects on his abject being as something other
than human being. He writes his childhood self as “clowning” everyone around him, so that
through his playful persona he might avoid being understood for what he really is, (or at least
what he understands himself to be) incapable of being Human. In doing so, the text of Ningen
Shikkaku is Yozo’s confession of his not being Human, and the anxious record of his suicidal life
as an artist.
Rather than autobiography as a contained and fixed literary understanding of subject-hood
or the self, Dazai scholar Alan Wolfe proposes that Michel Beaujour’s notion of the “selfportrait” more adequately encompasses the particularity of Dazai’s shishosetsu, within “a genre
that denies the very possibility of self-representation.”36 Wolfe asserts this reading in relationship
to and resisting the tradition of another Western literary tradition, that of autobiography.
Beaujour posits this genre as a distinct form from autobiography, whose aim is the chronological
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documentation or telos that culminates in a complete literary version of one’s life and
achievements—something at which Yozo’s notebooks clearly fail. Instead, paraphrasing from
John Michael’s review of Beaujour’s Poetics of the Literary Self-Portrait (or Miroir d’encre) in
MLN, “the attempt to embody the author’s unique individuality as it is at the moment of writing
in the language of his text, to incorporate himself in his corpus, that is essential to the genre. The
autoportrait is not the retelling of a life but the representation of a self.”37 Leaving the question of
the “author’s […] individuality” (in this case Dazai’s) as the thing to be represented to the side,
Ningen Shikkaku does not work to constitute the stable realized subject of the autobiography.
Rather, in faithfully painting the perceptions of a private self the text works towards a deconstitution of self. Of course in Ningen Shikkaku, this is always the type of perception, which is
incapable of representing that which is outside the disqualified workings of Yozo’s perceptions
of himself. Beaujour’s characterization of the genre is a trans-historical reach to excavate
fragmented works from the understanding of “autobiography” into a genre called the selfportrait. Following Wolfe’s appropriation of the notion of the self-portrait as the attempt to
represent the self—in this case the representation of the failed self of Yozo—underscores a
capacity to read critically Dazai’s relationship to Western literary forms.

❧
Re-reading anxiety in literature, I have addressed the specific anxieties of form that emerge
from reading Dazai’s Ningen Shikkaku from and against western literary and aesthetic
conventions. An understanding of the ontological character of a literary representation of anxiety
is legible partially in looking at Dazai from an undefined West, in terms of “literature,” “the
36
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novel” or “autobiography” and “the self.” This paper frames this comparative research though
its coinciding engagements with another author: the British novelist Iris Murdoch, writing her
novel The Sea, The Sea thirty years, and a world away from Dazai. Both of these works interact
in my reading as they represent authorial selves in the first-person, not autobiographically, but
understandable through the writing of the self. Their coincidentality elicits a primary concern in
my paper, to uncover and be attentive to the ways in which these works are dissimilar in terms of
the aesthetic of anxiety in representing the self. The way in which anxiety figures in the
construction of the self becomes apparent in the role of the sea, as both landscape and metaphor,
which problematizes the distinct employment of a Realist impulse inherent in the two works’
writing of the self.

Painting an Anxious Sea
Ningen Shikkaku and The Sea, The Sea both articulate a literary understanding of the self
that requires interpretation beyond a pathologized reading of their narrators’ anxiety. When Oba
Yozo recounts the cherry blossoms falling onto the sea in springtime, he does so in the staccato
of an impression. It reads as an attempt at realizing a representation of the natural world: a
painting of the sea. The text’s realism is its disqualification from the aesthetic possibility of
beauty, and its representation of the reflexive involvement with an inner sea of anxiety in the
limited first-person perspective of shishōsetsu. The question of the aesthetic, as it is structured by
the fundamental anxiety of the narration, is at issue in Ningen Shikkaku.
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Self-Portraiture and Ekphrasis
Looking at selections from both of these texts’ treatment of artistic production, beyond the
literary, and also their treatment of other works of art, painting emerges in both works as a key
site for locating my critique. I argue that painting is (and the ekphrastic: paintings are) an
anxious aesthetical site for the possibility of self-realization and its failure. In The Sea, The Sea,
Charles Arrowby is particularly affected by Titian’s painting Perseus and Andromeda, which he
sees as the uncanny mirror of his own peculiar haunting by a monster from the sea. Oba Yozo
aspires to an aesthetic treatment of the grotesque that he attributes to Modigliani and
Impressionism. In this section ekphrasis, and the literary metaphor of painting, is understood as
the site for an elaboration between the self and the world, a process of representing aesthetic
relationships between subject and object, which when read for their anxieties, are comprised by a
Heideggerian reading of affect. Additionally, in attempting to articulate the stakes of
representing and reading anxiety in these two literary works, this section examines Jameson’s
articulation of Realism in The Antinomies Of Realism alongside Heidegger’s own poetic
representations of affect, and his ekphrastic exposition of artwork in “The Origin of the Work of
Art.”
Wolfe’s citation of Beaujour’s term “l’autoportrait,” activates the metaphor of painting to
think about the ways in which a literary work represents the self. Yozo’s disqualification is not
finalized by suicide, but it is the suicidial self-portrait that is always already a condition of his
being. In Ningen Shikkaku, Yozo also aspires, and fails, to be a painter. In his youth he was
inspired by the attraction of Western painting to that which is not beautiful, but uncanny. In one
of his many reflections on his own orientation towards the idea of human-being, inspired by
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being shown a Modigliani portrait, Yozo writes “There are some people whose dread of human
beings is so morbid that they reach a point where they yearn to see with their own eyes monsters
of ever more horrible shapes.”38 Yozo’s fascination with this perspective, his identification with
the artistic community whose primary motivation is a “dread of human beings” extends to his
understanding of “Impressionism” as well. Distraught by his own paintings he admires how
The masters through their subjective perceptions created beauty out of trivialities. They
did not hide their interest even in things which were nauseatingly ugly, but soaked
themselves in the pleasure of depicting them. In other words, they seemed not to rely in
the least on the misconceptions of others. Now that I had been initiated by Takeichi into
these root secrets of the art of painting, I began to do a few self-portraits, taking care that
they not be seen by my female visitors39
Yozo aspires to be a painter, and is especially driven by the possibility of the self-portrait to
transform something “nauseatingly ugly” into art through “subjective perception.” The irony
here is the misinterpretation of impressionism. Plein-air depictions of haystacks, sunsets, peasant
life, gardens, the sea, evoke a certain realism through the assertion of a subjective perception as a
stylized interpretation of its subjects, but “Impressionism” in painting hardly signals a sort of
aesthetic interest in the horrifying or profane. This mis-identification with and of Impressionism
illustrates a confused relationship to the aesthetic, where the judgment of a work as producing
“beauty out of triviliaties” but most specifically “ugly” resonates with Yozo’s own selfdepiction. This mistaken, or at least esoteric, exposition of Impressionism underscores a
distancing of Dazai as author from the narration of Yozo. This is, of course, at odds with a
tradition of interpretation of shishōsetsu that validates the texts through their fundamental
conformity to the veracity of the author’s life. That being said, the affinity between Modigliani
and Dazai, as fatally tragic artists recuperates Yozo’s art historical failure as it presents a
38
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troubling reading of impressionism as the dark underside of those pretty paintings. The
elongation in Modigliani’s oil portraits might be analogous to the disturbing self-portait that is
Ningen Shikkaku’s distortion, its steady sinking tone, Yozo’s description of his “own harsher
current of gloom like a “withered leaf settling to rest on the stones at the bottom of a pool.”40
Yozo’s investment in his odd notion of impressionism is not just a position that asserts
“ugliness” as a critical possibility for aesthetic judgment, but also a sort of temporally structured
ugliness, which arises out of a disjuncture between the subject and the object. The
“impressionist” self-portrait then becomes a model for understanding the particular way in which
Ningen Shikkaku writes (or paints) the self.

The Realist Impulse
The inclusion of works of art, the description of representation as such in literary realism
presents an alternative to the narrative mode.41 In the context of the narrative, the term
“ekphrasis” takes on broader implications as the “painterly moment.” Returning to Yozo’s
observation of cherry blossoms falling into the sea in the spring—what I argued to be “a prop, a
painted screen, a set-piece”—I assert that the sea has the capacity to figure in such a sense as
non-narrative suspension of narrative, illuminating an important coincidence of the problematics
of affect and literary representation as such.
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The suspensions of novelistic narrative coincide in the affective preoccupation with
rendering literary anxiety in the The Sea, The Sea and Ningen Shikkaku. For Jameson’s
dialectical articulation of realism in The Antinomies of Realism, the impulse towards rendering
affect as a realist practice comprises one “antinomy” of realism. According to his articulation, “A
new concept of realism is…made available when we grasp both these terminal points
[antinomies] firmly at one and the same time.”42 Jameson diagrams this dialectical structure as
an irreducible tension between the force of the tale, its utility capitulated in the ideological
construction of a Bourgeois subject, and the possibility of its dissolution in a realism that
prioritizes the non-narrative “literary representation of affect.” In my examination of Dazai and
Murdoch’s anxieties, the ideological imposition of a unified subject is at stake for modern
literature. They both take as their object the autobiographical construction of a narrator’s self,
fictions which rely on the proposition of realism as an “aesthetic ideal,” as the terminus of
literary possibility provides an understanding of the being of literature itself as this fundamental
representational impulse towards an epistemological claim.
Realism, despite its periodizing capacity and its historical contingency and specificity, is
also fundamental to the very structure of the literary in Jameson’s work. Anxiety, colloquially
speaking, also seems to have this contradictory discursive existence, at once symptomatic and
specific, while also fundamental and ontological. Jameson’s antinomical dialectic of realism
subsumes notions of realism as defined through binaried opposition to other literary constructs—
such as modernism such as “realism vs. modernism”43 or, I might add, realism vs. Eastern
literature, or realism vs. the “I-novel.” Yet, this understanding of realism as the ontological
condition of literature, a part of its soul, seems undermined by the other periodizing binary
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examined in Jameson’s oeuvre: modernism and postmodernism. In differentiating between the
outlooks of so-called “high modernism” and “postmodernism” he wrote in his seminal work
Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism that “Edward Munch’s painting The
Scream is, of course, a canonical expression of the great modernist thematics of alienation,
anomie, solitude, social fragmentation, and isolation, a virtually programmatic emblem of what
used to be called the age of anxiety.44" This reading of the Munch painting as symptomatic of a
larger sociological pathology of anxiety provides foil for the postmodern condition’s prognosis,
Jameson’s famous “waning of affect”—cause: “schizophrenia.”

The Representation of Anxiety as Affect
My objection to the thesis of a “waning of affect” here may be different than Ngai’s, who
argues in her monograph Ugly Feelings that “negative affects” have become functional aspects
of contemporary capitalism. She asserts a reading of negative affects as “signs that not only
render visible different registers of problem (formal, ideological, sociohistorical) but conjoin
these problems in a distinctive manner.” 45 In this way, Ngai provides groundwork for a theory of
affect’s capacity for political critique. While we do agree in pursuing to “recuperate […]
negative affects for their critical productivity46”, in the investigation at hand, anxiety must be
understood not as a symptom of a problem arising in the subject, but instead as a larger
ontological structure. Affects, prior to Marxist or psychoanalytical approaches, might therefore
be understood as political, but in a quite different manner, as they are rendered in these literary
works in an aesthetic that reveals a deconstructive impulse in the bourgeois ideological
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framework of subject and object. In doing some critical exposition of Jameson’s positioning of
anxiety squarely in modernity, his framing of a the postmodern as a schizophrenic horizon, while
utilizing his grounding of literature in a realism composed of an affective antinomy, I hope also
to position my re-reading of anxiety as an ontological condition, rather than a pathologizable
symptom of modernity.
Jameson, while finding theoretical basis in Deleuze and Freud, and the bodily
present,47 simultaneously finds inspiration, as this paper does, in the possibility of finding an
origin for a theory of affect in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. He traces Heidegger’s use of
the term Stimmung, usually translated as mood, to conceive of affect phenomenologically:
I have for some time found suggestive Heidegger’s inaugural invocation of affect—the
starting point, not only of Sartrean phenomenology but also of Merleau-Ponty’s attempts
to formulate embodiment—and that turns on the German word “Stimmung,” of which the
English “mood” is but a pale and one-dimensional equivalent. Heidegger wanted to show
that Stimmung was neither subjective nor objective, neither irrational nor cognitive, but
rather a constitutive dimension of our being-in-the-world48
It is worthwhile to bring in Jameson’s reference here as the exemplification of the conflict
between psychoanalytical and Heideggerian interpretive models of affect. Affect differs in the
sense of Stimmung from a model of feeling that finds its origin in a psychoanalytic stimulus,
reliant on a subject perceiving an external object—the bourgeois subject which must remain
solid as it transverses the distances between past, present, and future. This is the same bourgeois
subject ideologically affirmed in literary realism, against which affect must therefore be
47
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understood temporally, as the non-narrative presencing which undoes a stable narrative of the
self.
It is possible also to read the self-portraiture of Dazai and Murdoch along these lines,
where anxiety itself delineates the limitation of internal and external, and therefore is the final
inscription of realism’s self-realized subjectivity. However, this analysis elides “alienation” and
“anxiety” in such a way as to ignore the actual implications of understanding of affect informed
by Heidegger’s stimmung in favor of a periodization that makes possible the projection of a
schizoid postmodernity. Jameson’s observation in Postmodernism, or, The Logic of Late
Capitalism that The Scream “underscores its own failure”49 in its attempt, and ultimate inability,
to realize the sound of the emanating scream itself through the language of the painting’s title
and its paint medium, is kindred to the Yozo’s disqualification in Ningen Shikkaku, his mistaken
interpretation of impressionist painting, and the ultimate failure of his self-portrait to realize its
realist aspirations and solidify Yozo’s bourgeois personhood (Ironically it is the this failure itself
received as alienation that is the ultimate marker of Bourgeois personhood in modernism).
Rather than an alienation which only serves to re-evaluation the bourgeois subject, I assert the
failure described in The Scream to constitute a stable subject, the echoes of the scream drawn out
of the body into that reverberating present to form ripples in the water and sky, as the
deconstruction of a stable subjectivity and the location of anxiety outside of a subject object
relationship. The subject is the scream itself: anxiety preceding any stable subject as a mood,
which is not projected, externalized, or stimulated. Likewise, it is in this way that understanding
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The Sea, The Sea and Ningen Shikkaku as self-portraiture, the unstable attempt to represent the
self through non-narrative means, locates a representation of affect which can re-read anxiety
specifically as a constitutive way of being-in-the-world.
❦
In The Sea, The Sea, the ekphrasis of Titian’s painting Perseus and Andromeda plays a
very different role than Yozo’s flawed hopeful investment in a mistaken idea of Impressionism
in Ningen Shikkaku. While they both illustrate a non-narrative anxiety, Murdoch uses the
painting as a prop amongst others, as a part of a larger theatrical staging of an uncanny selfreflection. The importation of art objects into the novelistic narrative, as quoted in Jameson
above, is part of a “coalescing” of differing forms into the text. While the role of paintings qua
art objects incorporated into the text of a literary work might usually capitalize on the ekphrastic
economy of the work—the importation of the position of the original artwork’s historical and
discursive context—it is the non-narrative rupture that Murdoch addresses. She writes anxiety as
a forcing open. Forcing open, as the failure of intention in the bourgeois subject’s self-reflection,
and of a certain expectation of objects, material and textual which do not quite coalesce as
expected. Coalescing disrupts itself, narrative disrupted, and disrupted by plot. While Dazai
renders anxiety through the notion of “disqualification,” where the suicidal self-portrait’s flat
tone never reaches for the sublime or revelatory, anxiety emerges as an affective peak in The
Sea, The Sea inasmuch as it emerges as a break or fissure in the novel’s obsessive plot.
Disturbing objects and odd hallucinations haunt the protagonist Charles Arrowby during
his retirement to a ramshackle seaside home. The sea births from its froth a horrifying vision of a
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sea-serpent, immediately compromising his intention to comfortably retire to the sea—as he
states in the first pages of his “prehistory”, to “abjure magic” for a “period of meditation”50:
I was sitting, with this notebook beside me, upon the rocks just above my ‘cliff’, and
looking over the water. The sun was shining, the sea was calm. (As I have described it in
the first paragraph of this notebook.) Shortly before this I had been looking intently into a
rock pool and watching a remarkably long reddish faintly bristly sea-worm which had
wreathed itself into curious coils prior to disappearing into a hole. I sat up, then settled
myself facing seaward, blinking in the sun. Then, not at once, but after about two
minutes, as my eyes became accustomed to the glare, I saw a monster rising from the
waves. 51
It is not only the “long thickening body with a ridgy spiny back” that “coiled itself so that the
long neck circled twice” through which he “could see the sky” that so violently disturbed
Arrowby’s opportunity for moral self-reflection. This vision, described in so much detail, is only
one image among a mass of strange moments that affect the narrator. In the exposition of his
house, called “Shruff End”, he describes the drawing room as “more of a lookout point than a
room. It is dominated by a tall black-painted wooden chimney piece, with a lot of little shelves
with little mirrors above them. A collector’s item, no doubt, but it looks a little too like the altar
of some weird sect.”52 This small detail could be a throwaway sentiment, however, the
movement that occurs between the appraisal of the antique as “a collector’s item” and his
creeping feeling that it might have an altogether different existence as a ceremonial object for the
obliquely pop-cultural idea of “some weird sect” taps into the uncanny as a feeling generated in
the movement, or tension between the settled and unsettled. Furthermore, it is through an
accumulation of these seemingly insignificant observations that the novel builds an uncanny
tone.
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Arrowby describes his curious attachment to a “hideous green vase” but notes that behind
it there is “a shallow alcove which looks as if it should contain a statue, but empty resembles a
door."53 The confusion of what should have the properties of alcove according to its function and
construction and its enigmatically resembling “a door” opens up the possibility of confusing
symbolic intrusions and an odd affective dissonance. Among the references to small objects and
architectural spaces as a primary locus for the narrator’s representation of uncanny feeling
Arrowby’s characterization of “the space of the upper landing” where he says, “I call this a
‘space’ because it is rather odd area with an atmosphere all its own. It has the expectant air of a
stage set,”54 merits specific critical attention. With Arrowby’s emphasis on the concept of
“space,” the narration seems to attribute a changing or intrinsic mood to the architecture of the
house itself. In this way, “atmosphere” seems to articulate an understanding of an uncanny
anxiety about where feeling itself is occurring, and what it would mean for it to be generated,
and felt, outside the self of the self-reflective bourgeois subject.

Heidegger’s Stimmung in Art
Jameson describes the location of affect in the object (or perhaps the attribution of
subjectivity to the object, its animation) however, in contradiction to Heidegger’s stimmung,
when he calls up the work of Gaston Bachelard (who also seems especially relevant here in terms
of the narrator’s focus on ‘space’):
Heidegger wanted to show that Stimmung was neither subjective nor objective, neither
irrational nor cognitive, but rather a constitutive dimension of our being-in-the-world;
and his term goes well beyond the characterization of a cloudy sky as “ominous” or a
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particular kind of lighting as “sinister,” as in Gaston Bachelard’s psychoanalysis of the
elements (joyously rippling streams, stagnant pools).55
Following along the lines explicated here by Jameson would put a Heideggerian theory of
affect in contradiction to my portrayal of the uncanny moments in Murdoch. However, in
conceiving of these uncanny moments and objects staged textually, the theater of Murdoch’s
prose invites us to ascertain how the fact that anxiety is rendered literarily, and therefore
aesthetically, might interface with Heidegger’s fundamentally ontological understanding of
stimmung. As I have alluded to in quoting Ngai above, the theorization of affect forms the basis
for a critical theoretical practice. My thesis addresses anxiety’s specificity as an affect, finding
origin in a Heideggerian “destruktion” of the subject and object of aesthetics, where anxiety
works towards revealing unheimlich as constitutive of being-in-the-world.
In working towards an affect theory contrived through the notion of Stimmung, the
role of the literary becomes a problematic site for explicating a Heideggerian ontology. The
formulation of Jameson’s—while making the important and fundamental distinction between
affect qua Stimmung and any psychoanalytic approach which ‘treats’ affects through its
interpretive grammar of objectification (its primary and original technology is the observation
and description of the analysand in service of an epistemological key to the psyche of Bourgeois
subjectivity)56 —must be extended to account for literary tonality and the representation of affect
as legitimate and justified sites for a Heideggerian inquiry into affect. In The Origin of the Work
of Art, Heidegger advances a relationship between the artwork and his fundamental ontology
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with the notion that “poetry is the saying of the unconcealment of Being.” 57

In his

expositions of equipment, it is in fact through the ekphrasis of a painting, Van Gogh’s shoes that
Heidegger arrives at what constitutes the distinct being of equipment, and artwork. Referring not
to the representation in Van Gogh’s painting but to the materiality of peasant shoes themselves
Heidegger explains that
The peasant woman wears her shoes in the field. Only here are they what they are. They
are all the more genuinely so, the less the peasant woman thinks about the shoes while
she is at work, or looks at them at all, or is even aware of them. She stands and walks in
them. That is how shoes actually serve. It is in this process of the use of equipment that
we must actually encounter the character of equipment.58
It is quite curious of course, then, that Heidegger stages the encounter with the being of
equipment through the literary exposition of an artwork. He also acknowledges this when he
begins to describe Van Gogh’s painting with the caveat that “From Van Gogh’s painting we
cannot even tell where these shoes stand. There is nothing surrounding this pair of peasant shoes
in or to which they might belong—only an undefined space […] A pair of peasant shoes and
nothing more. And yet.” 59 The painting of shoes itself is a selection; a representation of just the
shoes, and in this sense cannot render the system of contingent relationships to the world that
actually constitutes their being. It is through the fragment—“And yet.”—that Heidegger
emphasizes the capacity for artwork itself, through its origin in poesy, to disclose being. The
philosopher incorporates the painting to reveal the being of the specific type of thing called
“equipment,” in this case peasant’s shoes, whose qualities evoke “the toilsome tread of the
work”, “the accumulated tenacity of [the peasant woman’s] slow trudge through the far-
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spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field”, and “the dampness and richness of the soil.”60
Poetry then has a special ability to paint, out of its object of representation, the earth itself in
which beings dwell, and to reveal being itself as being-in-the-world. Where, in the example of a
representation of peasant’s shoes revealing their being as equipment, and the structure of
equipment’s essential being as such, Heidegger also advances the claim that “The equipmental
quality of equipment was discovered […] Not by a description and explanation of a pair of shoes
actually present […] but only by bringing ourselves before Van Gogh’s painting. […] In the
nearness of the work we were suddenly somewhere else than we usually tend to be.”61 Like the
famous segment on ‘broken tools’ in Sein und Zeit, it is only through a transportation, or
movement, the apprehension con-text itself, that the truth of being is un-concealed. In the
addendum Heidegger clarifies that truth must be understood precisely as “‘to place’ and ‘to set’
and ‘to lay’ […] as for instance, letting a statue be set up.62 ” This famous passage from
Heidegger’s oeuvre, while not directly related to his exposition of Stimmung, proves the way in
which his ontology relies on the representation that happens in artwork, not as an aesthetics of
subject and object, but in its ability to reveal. Furthermore, the implication of the textuality itself,
its ekphrasis, in the structure of Heidegger’s argumentation, figures as the central rhetorical
move to bring about an understanding of artwork. In this way not only does he say that “Van
Gogh’s painting is the disclosure of what the equipment, the pair of peasant shoes, is in truth” 63
or more dauntingly, “Art is truth setting itself to work”64 but that this happens through the
hermeneutic process of being written about an artwork in order to explicate his notion of
equipment. His rich analysis here must be taken as showing how fundamental existential
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structures are revealed in truth (aletheia) not through their correspondence to some authentic
notion of the objects of representation, but through their very happening as textual works, as the
staging of ekphrasis.
Heidegger reroutes attention from an aesthetic ideology of art by suggesting a radical
notion of artwork as the unconcealment of the truth of being, outside of and without a Kantian,
or as I apply it here, psychoanalytic subject: “Setting and placing here never mean the modern
concept of commandeering things to be placed over against the self (the ego-subject).”65 I have
departed from Murdoch so unwittingly and at such length in explicating Heidegger’s notion of
“setting to work” in order to adequately re-imagine Murdoch’s ekphrasis and her representation
of anxiety, just as that, a staging which has ontological claims despite its possible reduction to a
psychoanalytic reading, where the uncanny appears as a trope, a mere technique for writing the
subject, rather than an affective work.

The Uncanny Staging of Anxiety in Murdoch
In The Sea, The Sea anxiety figures legibly in many instances through the device we are
most accustomed to calling the “uncanny.” It is through the economy of a device like the
uncanny, that the movement of anxiety is represented ekphrastically. In my interpretation, I read
the novel for an understanding relationship between the uncanny moments and the anxious self
constructed in the work, in terms of a setting-up of an understanding of anxiety that questions
rather than affirms the bourgeois subject of a psychoanalytic reading of anxiety.
Contributing to the uncanny of certain objects in The Sea, The Sea is Charles’ sense that
there must be some explanation for their seemingly inexplicable weirdness. The objects are set
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against his long passages of introspection or his descriptions of the seashore, so that they stand
out as non-narrative interruptions in the coalescing of novelistic text. Murdoch’s novel works by
way of this staging of uncanny moments through in the theatre of Charles’ life. Considering
theatre, comparing it to other arts, and waxing about his off-stage life he uses the medium of
memoir to philosophize: “Have I abjured that magic, drowned my book? Forgiven my enemies?
The surrender of power, the final change of magic into spirit? Time will show.”66 The uncanny
objects disrupt even this sort of non-narrative retrospection. After a break in the text, Charles
references his own writing, as he both breaks into the present, and re-enters the magical theatre
of uncanny set pieces:
Something rather odd and distressing just occurred. I wrote the above sitting outside on
my lawn […] I went into the house and up the stairs […] I was at once aware that
something had happened, although I could not understand what. Then I realized that my
lovely big ugly vase was gone from its pedestal. It had fallen on to the floor and was
broken into a great many pieces. But how?67
He continues to question what scenario could have caused the heavy vase to fall: the wind? Did
he shift it while dusting, or was there an earthquake? Later, he questions the locals about
poltergeists, quoting himself as saying “Did you ever hear that there was one at Shruff End?”68
Charles’ line of questioning itself creates a movement in this representation of an object—the
prop—to stage a textual affectation of the uncanny.
That most uncanny object, the sea serpent itself, accounts for a peculiarly intense fixation.
He tries to attribute, in his peculiarly fuddy-duddy way, his initial vision to a hallucination
brought on as a flashback to an LSD trip, or perhaps to a mere visual effect created by the
transposition of a small coiled worm he was watching at the time. While his attempt to locate the
source of these uncanny occurrences, to render them mere props by means of explanatory resolve
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are at times successful—the broken vase turns out to have been a purposeful attempt at
frightening him by his ex-lover, the actress Rosina—his resolution of the sea-serpent
hallucination bears the peculiar mark of a revelatory explanation that stinks of theatrical
“magic.”
❦
It is through the peculiar ekphrasis of the Titian painting, “Perseus and Andromeda,” that
the staging of the novel’s anxiety, and ultimate refusal of novelistic resolution and revelation is
revealed. Returning to London, ironically, to escape the drama of the seascape, Charles decides
to visit the Wallace Collection, a museum he remembers from childhood. Upon entering the
empty main picture gallery there is a moment of high suspense, then the reveal: an uncanny
event of almost kitsch proportions comes into being through ekphrasis itself. Charles recounts,
“The gallery was empty. Then I noticed something that seemed odd, a sort of resonant
coincidence.” 69The sea monster appears through ghostly means, the anxious non-narrative
horizon of the novel through an intertextual recalling of the earlier appearances of uncanny
objects; Charles identifies its source, Titian’s painting “Perseus and Andromeda.” While he does
describe the composition, the painting’s significance comes from its ability to illicit Charles own
memory as he writes “I seemed to notice suddenly, though I had seen it many times before, the
terrible fanged open mouth of the sea dragon […] and the memory of that hallucination or
whatever it was, was suddenly more disquieting that it had ever been since the first shock of its
appearance.”70 This ekphrasis eschews meaningful content as an aspect of the incorporation of
this actual painting. Instead, incorporating it into the text for its “disquieting” potential, as the
most significant object of uncanny in the novel. It seemingly offers an origin for Charles’ sea
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monster while ultimately only strangely slant-rhyming as “The sea dragon did not quite resemble
my sea monster, but the mouth was very like.”71
Much of the suspense already relieved in the realization of this uncanny moment,
Murdoch heightens the dramatic flair to the level of spectacle with the literal introduction of a
prop: “I began to walk away down the long room and as I did so the hammering of the workmen
down below seemed to be becoming more rhythmic, clearer, faster, more insistent, like the sound
of those wooden clappers, which the Japanese call hyoshigi.”72 The diagetic sounds of the
workmen become the folly of a theatrical sound. Charles implicates the suspense of the moment
directly, unpacking his metaphor in the explanation that they “are used to create suspense or
announce doom in the Japanese theatre, and which I often used to use myself in my own
plays.”73

His self-portrait is in fact a staging of various theatrical devices, the uncanny that

residue from the failed abjuring of a theatrical logic. In this moment of heightened anxiety, every
element, art objects, his memories, the techniques of realism, and affect itself has been
transformed in this climactic section of the novel into a prop on the play of Charles’ memoir. The
magic of each set piece its evocation of an uncanny that Charles ironically misses as the
production of his own ‘direction’, rendered comically here in his admission that the very
suspense of his own life is rendered by way of metaphor as a theatrical trick of his own devising.
In addition to the Titian painting and the hyoshigi, all of the Charles primary concerns in the
novel—his delusional desire for his long lost and idealized childhood lover, Hartley, and his
manipulative but also sincere relationship with her wayward and alienated son—seem to resolve
(or dissolve?) in this suspenseful logic of theatrical appearance: “I turned quickly and found
70
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myself face to face with, directly opposite, Rembrandt’s picture of Titus. So Titus was here too.
Titus and the sea monster and the stars and holding Hartley’s hand in the cinema over forty years
ago.”74 75The paintings in the gallery and the lights of the cinema appear in the novel as props
appear on stage, devices incorporated to produce a revelation of metaphor in the narrative. In this
sense there is a complex relationship between their non-narrative evocations of the uncanny,
which occurs in temporal present analogous to the Kantian motion of the sublime, and their
staging as objects that produce as much as they interrupt plot. These anxieties of the novel
inform my reading of anxiety as literary affect inasmuch as an explication of mechanics of the
novel itself (its anxious tone) disrupts the fiction of Charles’ attempt represent himself in
autobiography or memoir. Their configuration in the novel as a part of the narrative then raises
the technical question of how Murdoch’s text, to fall back on Jameson’s articulation or realism,
coalesces various forms and devices in its representation of affect as it stages a logic of theatrical
appearance through the uncanny.

The Sea in Murdoch
The Sea, The Sea opens with Charles Arrowby, having left “the theater” and retired,
describing the seashore in solitude. It is drab, detailed, subdued and somewhat uninteresting in
the early summer haze:
The sea which lies before me as I write glows rather sparkles in the bland May sunshine.
With the tide turning, it leans quietly against the land, almost unflecked by ripples or by
foam. Near to the horizon it is a luxurious purple, spotted with regular lines of emerald
green. At the horizon it is indigo. Near to the shore, where my view is framed by rising
heaps of humpy yellow rock, there is a band of lighter green, icy and pure, less radiant,
opaque however, not transparent. We are in the north, and the bright sunshine cannot
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penetrate the sea. Where the gentle water taps the rocks there is still a surface skin of
colour. The cloudless sky is very pale at the indigo horizon which it lightly pencils in
with silver. Its blue gains towards the zenith and vibrates there. But the sky looks cold,
even the sun looks cold.76
He struggles to describe exactly the complexity of the light’s effect on even the most mundane
“band of lighter green,” calling it “icy and pure, less radiant, opaque however, not transparent.”
Charles’ representation of the view comes into focus through his attention to locating within his
field of vision a horizon line, and from there, filling in colors and forms. It is its quality as
“framed”—like an oil seascape—“by rising heaps of humpy yellow rock” that brings his
description into focus. The narration functions through painterly metaphors, so that Charles’
view itself constitutes the locale— as a moment in time, the day, the particular local climate
effects, the flat feeling of late spring stasis, the geographical context of “the north”—through the
specific strokes of detail he writes. His attention to the specific hues of color imposes them like
the intentional application of pigment to a canvas. Conversely, the description also writes the
world of the seashore on its own terms and as functioning beyond the confines of a painting. It
describes the “tide” as “turning” while “lean[ing] quietly against the land.” The “water taps the
rocks,” the very “blue” that the narrator names “vibrates,” and the rocks that themselves “frame”
his view are also “rising.” The most important agency, of the subject’s more than grammatical
relationship to the object, in Charles’ imperious attempt at memoir, is his rather trite illustration
of the drab North Sea. However, Charles’ ‘painting’ also attributes the intentional grip of the
brush to the “cloudless sky”, giving it the capacity to “pencil” the “indigo horizon” “with silver.”
At the level of the textual depiction of visual “views,” these are the same questions of
representation (primary in all inquiries into aesthetics) that this paper immediately raised in
relationship to the image that began this essay in Dazai’s presentation of the sea. Ningen
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Shikkaku’s “realism” premised a narratorial assertion in the tradition of shishōsetsu that limits
the text’s ability to risk description outside the terms of the confined subjectivity of Yozo
himself, for the most part precluding the depiction of landscape. Unlike Ningen Shikkaku, The
Sea, The Sea abounds with similar depictions of the seashore as landscape, attributing affective
significance through a literary strategy other than through the shishōsetsu’s peculiar angst of
disqualification that qualifies the suicidal despair of Yozo’s self-portrait. In the interpretive
confluence of the analysis of anxiety, uncanny, and the aesthetic claims problematized by the
affective valence of their view of the seascape, these two works coincide. While their formal
strategies largely differ, they both exemplify a tangent relationship to the modernist literary
vanguard. Where the nomenclature of self-portraiture and its failure characterizes the technical
strategy of self-reflection in Ningen Shikkaku, Murdoch’s novelistic fiction establishes a type of
retrospective fiction that stages—in the sense that invokes its own formal artifice—anxiety
through the formal failure of the autobiographical narrative of its protagonist.
This analysis refrains from, in fact eschews the very possibility, of suggesting that The Sea,
The Sea radically intends a new novelistic subject or aesthetic paradigm. Instead, a thread of
interpretation transverses the paper that relies on an critical understanding of the strategies of
subjection that lack a vanguardist or destructive literary practice in order to suggest alternate
interpretive modes that re-read modern literary anxiety. This critical orientation foregrounds the
possibility of posing the question of how can we impose to read the self in these works in a
contradictory, rather than conservative relationship to the neurotic subject.
Immediately following Charles’ description of the view, the perspective of the narrator
changes. The writing of the landscape no longer occurs in the present as it is interrupted by a
new voice, that of him writing at a later date: “I had written the above, destined to be the opening
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paragraph of my memoirs, when something happened which was so extraordinary and so
horrible that I cannot bring myself to describe it even now after an interval of time.”77 The novel
derives an element of realism from its retrospective narration. The present tense of Charles’
narration must be re-formed to the past tense by the retrospective comments of later writing. The
play between the writing of the view, imagined as occurring near simultaneously to the event of
observation, and the writing of the retrospection, where the event described has already occurred,
generates an aesthetic claim to reality. When Charles refers to his previous writing, the fiction of
the memoir gains credence from the narrator’s self-conscious articulation of the act of writing
itself.
The novel and the fiction of Charles’ memoir conflict. The realism deriving from the
intimacy with the character that also acts as the retrospective narrator contrasts with moments of
uncanny rupture, those set pieces that stage the interruption of the narrative of the novel by plot.
When Charles writes, “something happened […] so horrible that I cannot bring myself to
describe it” this is only the first instance where the novel figures plot as an additional element
superficial to the interaction between the narrative and non-narrative elements of Charles’
retrospection, such that it interrupts Charles’ ‘painting of the sea.’ Objects in his house, and the
expected and unexpected arrival of guests from London impose plot and distract from his
objective of setting down a “record of mingled thoughts and daily observations: ‘my philosophy’
my pensées against a background of simple descriptions of the weather and other natural
phenomena.”78 The most emblematic of these objects is the sea serpent he refers to from the very
opening of the novel in the section titled “Prehistory.” The first interruption which haunts him
throughout the novel, dramatically emerging from the painting of the sea itself (including the
77
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Titian painting) literally transforming ekphrasis or landscape observation, the illusion of setting
as reality, into a stage for setting the plot in motion.
Charles fails as the “director” of his own writing. Despite his notion that “Of course there
is no need to separate ‘memoir’ from ‘diary’ or ‘philosophical journal’ […] why not? It can all
come out naturally as I reflect. Thus unanxiously (for am I not now leaving anxiety behind?) I
shall discover my ‘literary form’”79, anxiety ultimately and ironically emerges from the
narrator’s attempt to reflect “naturally” when we investigate the formal aspects of novel. As
Murdoch’s novel situates itself as a late 20th century realist novel, while the narrator sets out to
articulate himself autobiographically, through various forms of retrospection and descriptions of
setting in terms of personal history. Rather than a complete and “unanxious” articulation of the
self after the fact, where the novel might constitute a cohesive writing of the subject, signified by
the titling of the sections of the novel “Prehistory” and “History”, I assert that the novel stages
the retrospection of the self, and the ultimate constitution of the self through an anxious failure of
the very notion of a stable autobiographical subject, in the structure of its coalescing of forms
and the interruption of Charles’ personal historical account of himself by plot itself. The
“uncanny” then can be understood additionally as a technical aspect of the novel’s formal
representation of the self.

Realism, Affect and Murdoch’s Moralism
Charles obsesses over the formalities of his writing, which in addition to the various
temporalities of the narrator’s writing itself incorporates the text letters from friends and
comments on the accuracy of the dialogue he reproduces from conversations. I asserted above
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that the self-conscious narrator of this type of retrospective fiction generates an aesthetic claim to
reality. In one of many prominent interviews with Iris Murdoch in The Paris Review, she
characterizes her definition of the authoritative authorial persona capable of producing good art
as grounded in a notion of justice that she explicitly links to the aesthetic claims of realism:
“There is a conception of truth, a lack of illusion, an ability to overcome selfish obsessions, …
Good art, whatever its style, has qualities of hardness, firmness, realism, clarity, detachment,
justice, truth…bad art is the soft, messy self-indulgent work of an enslaved fantasy.”80 Murdoch
seems to be, by her own definition, a “good artist”, in the “firmness” of moral judgment81 that
emphasizes and contrasts her authorial judgment, with the narrator’s, Charles’, personae as
engaged in the “messy self-indulgent work of an enslaved fantasy.”
The novel for Murdoch becomes the distant stage she can direct. The imaginative work of
the writing of literature produces a distance that allows for “detachment.” Murdoch aspires in her
literary orientation to the works of “Dickens, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy” as “wise moralistic writers
who portray the complexity of morality and the difficulty of being good.”82 In her construction of
a realist literary tradition as the context for the authorship of her work, notable differences
between her stagings of Arrowby’s self-reflection in The Sea, The Sea’s realism and the earlier
tradition of the high realist novel emerge.
According to literary critical tradition, realism in literature, and as an aesthetic paradigm
itself, has been called into question after its encounter and disassembly by literary modernism.83
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In this sense, Murdoch’s construction of a realist context for her novelistic production encounters
modernism through its rehearsal of an antimodernist “conservative” position. Murdoch scholar
Bran Nicol convincingly argues in her work Iris Murdoch: The Retrospective Fiction that that
“Modernism often functions in her thought as the antithesis of nineteenth-century realism, and
the frequency and vigor with which she positions herself against it prove just as important to her
work as her desire to return to realism.”84 The realism of The Sea, The Sea derives from
Murdoch’s presentation of the memoir form in order to construct a narrative account of the
narrator’s self, and in doing so represents her protagonist as a novelistic self averse to and
against modernism.
In The Antinomies of Realism, Jameson describes the movement from a realism of an early
“first” period in modernity which demystifies as it constructs Bourgeois subjectivity, and a later
realistic novel that defamiliarizes as a weakening of the realist novel’s negative function.85 It is
precisely what might be called a refusal to engage with a vanguardist literary practice that
Jameson articulates as a historical trajectory of realism that interests me as I read the paperback
edition of The Sea, The Sea. In terms an investment in a realism that stands outside those
particular boundaries, or revolutions, of periodization, Murdoch’s novels raise the particular
question of how to interpret the function of realism after that “later realistic novel” (a designation
under which Jameson includes a notion of the modernist novel proper). While the historical
materialism undergirding all of Jameson’s periodizing asserts that art produced under the latecapitalist conditions of production as essentially postmodern, I additionally understand The Sea,
The Sea as postmodern inasmuch as it exhibits the “anti-modern” impulse to resurrect a realist
aesthetic in the fiction of Charles Arrowby’s retrospection. Assuming realism has some intrinsic
84
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“negative” function as an aesthetic strategy, how does it—in the instance of a recovery of a
bourgeois subject of a realism extant prior to its ‘defamiliarization’ in modernism—unfold in a
works like Murdoch’s?
Thinking about the subject of realism, the question of interpretation must return to the
representation of the self (already the primary concern and organizing thematic in the The Sea,
The Sea) produced in such a reflection. Rather than the anxious self of modernity—screams
failing to sound in paint that merely makes marks on canvas, unable to escape its acknowledged
frame—Murdoch reaches back to a tradition of a realized novelist subject. While I will not do
justice to Murdoch’s vast philosophical output, I want to highlight what Bran Nicol in Iris
Murdoch: The Retrospective Fiction argues about Murdoch’s understanding of “the soul” in her
essay Against Dryness. She writes that Murdoch’s invocation of the “soul” complicates both the
‘postmodern’ and ‘liberal’ understandings of subjectivity. […] Murdoch proposes that one area
is especially neglected: ‘for the Liberal world, philosophy is not in fact at present able to offer us
any other complete and powerful picture of the soul’.”86 Indeed, rather than the language of a
return to the bourgeois subject of early modernity—perhaps the “Liberal” subject of earlier
British writers to whose inheritance she aspires—Murdoch attempts to “regenerate” a “soul” of
the lost subject through her novels.
Nicol argues that “her attempt to regenerate the liberal conception of the soul chiefly
involves recourse to the works of Freud.”87 Extending my earlier assertion about her realist
strategy as a conservative faith in the subject and the necessity for moral judgment as the primary
economy of the novel-form, the premise becomes clear that in Charles’ narration the affective
inflection of his retrospection, interpreted as neuroses, constitutes the material on which such a
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“moral” judgment might draw evidence. In this type of history, as the object of retrospection,
writes Nicol, “the past is continually made present in her fiction: through guilt, nostalgia, the
uncanny and the attempt to understand the past through rational investigation.” 88 In this
interpretation, The Sea, The Sea has departed in its regeneration of a soul for the subject from
realist project predicated on social critique of the bourgeois variety, to the affirmation of
psychoanalytic ontology of a neurotic subject.
In Civilization and its Discontents, Freud asserted that instances of unhappiness, what we
might refer to in the discourse at hand as negative affects, allow us to comprehend, and in fact
constitute, subjectivity. While “our possibilities of happiness are already restricted by our
constitution” for Freud it is through the common experiences of unhappiness that we apprehend
“our own body”, “the external world” and “our relations to other men” as “we are threatened
with suffering from [these] three direction.”89 In The Sea, The Sea, Murdoch stages Charles’
retrospection through a thematic of failure; interrupted by plot, the uncanny return of people
from his past, and the coalescing of anxious textual elements (objects in the story, the plot, and
even the techniques of representation) producing a theatre of the self in which “unhappiness” is
certainly constitutive. However, from a psychoanalytical perspective, affects act “As warning
signals”90 though most basically to “apprehend” danger, but thereby also serving interpretively
as neurotic expressions of the constitution and delineation of an affected subject. I assert in my
reading, to the contrary, that the literary use of affect in the novel, both through its formal
anxieties and the failures of its realism more basically problematizes the very aesthetic claim to a
stable subject.
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❧
Even after the careful exposition of the techniques for representing anxiety as an affect in
the novel, my reading does not divorce the negative affects in the novel from their functions to
reproduce the ideology of a neurotic modern subject. In reading these works, a rehearsed
psychoanalytic interpretive framework assimilates the skillfully crafted relationship between
negative affect, and Murdoch’s investment in a realism attuned to the first principle of moral
judgment dependent on determining the individual as a stable subject. His hope to “abjure” the
magic of theatre when he says, “I am tired of it all. There has been a moral change,”91 reads
ironically in the ultimate perception of Charles failure to eschew his reputation as an egotistical
tyrant. In essence, the staging of Charles’ neurosis though the various failures rendered in the
memoir as uncanny events that motivate plot or through the regret, shame, desire that comprise
the anxious tone and characterizes the narrators retrospection serve to construct another level of
failure, the subtle divide between Charles’ narration and the novel’s realist horizon as a theatre
for the moral judgment of its subjects.
The novel stages Charles’ hope to reflect his selfhood in writing about his life and times,
after his retirement from theatre to the sea. That anticipatory affect of hope fails in the sense that
it ultimately mutates into another anticipatory affect of anxiety. Anxiety emerges amidst the
realism of Charles’ descriptions of the landscape and the recollection of a personal history from
distressing uncanny moments and an interruptive staging of plot. Murdoch debases the novel
form’s armature of plot to the most histrionic artifice of literal plotting, which centers around the
theatricality of Charles’ absurd, and unethical attempt to ensnare his long lost childhood “love”
Hartley, now an average elderly woman dissimilar to him and settled into old-age and marriage.
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While autobiography assumes the stasis of the present author, in The Sea, The Sea the uncanny
sets the stage for a propelled by the anticipatory logic of Charles’ anxiety.
After his desperate and repeated intervening into Hartley’s life, she secretly visits his home
unbeknownst to her jealous husband. Charles lies to her about the time until she has stayed late
enough that her husband will realize she has been to visit him. Charles reflects on this moment,
writing, “I ought to have rushed after her like a flash, like a faithful dog. I ought to have dragged
her back and kept her in the house by force. Instead some stupid instinct made me pause to pick
up the candles.”92 Motivated by regret at his failure, the protagonist’s desires are the subject of
his recollection and the audience’s moral scrutiny at character’s insipid ignorance of his own
mania. This romantic quest, the failed anxious attempt to capture Hartley, the plotting that drives
Charles’ to write these episodes manifests neurotic. Affect is staged ironically then, as a means
for producing an ethical judgment critical of the narrator’s delusion.
A different kind of affective significance emerges when Charles recounts how he ran
outside to retrieve Hartley in vain, only a moment too late: “I ran out into blue almost-darkness
and the silent emptiness of the rocky shore…I could at first see nothing , and it struck me in an
odd way that while I was talking to Hartley I had forgotten about the sea, forgotten it was there
and now felt confounded and at a loss to find myself half blind among those terrible rocks.”
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The backdrop of the sea, which had receded as the plot took control of the novel, emerges

again to striking effect. Charles remembers himself as set against the sea. This logic of
appearance mimics the uncanny movement of other moments in the work by which the strange is
introduced into the staging of the self. Charles feels “confounded” and “at a loss” as the
seemingly constant “backdrop” of the sea suddenly emerges from a state of forgetting. However
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this feeling occurs not as neurosis, but as an aspect of a larger scene, of finding himself in terms
of the spatialized strangeness “among those terrible rocks” and through the temporal event of
being “struck…in an odd way.” The realization of the temporal structure of retrospection itself,
as the means by which Charles exists as a self, is fundamentally understood through an affective
relationship to the sea that resists the plot. The uncanny figures then as the provocation of
interest through which affect moves as interaction between the narrative and non-narrative
writing of Charles’ anxious self. In this way, I read this instance of feeling in the novel as an
anxiety that articulates a notion of being distinct from or ulterior to the subject of realism
apprehended through moral judgment and the psychoanalysis of neurosis.

‘Thrownness’ in The Sea, The Sea
Constituting affect as an aesthetic experience of being thrown into the world, in Being and
Time Heidegger uses the term “thrownness” to characterize the apprehension of the temporal
structure of Being. Heidegger understands anxiety as a mood through “thrownness” where mood
points towards an orientation in, or understanding of Being alternative to a subjectivity and
affects that are the result of stimulus from or projection onto objects. In this way, his theorization
of mood can inform a definition of affect as a fundamental revelation of Being. Heidegger
elaborates “Thrownness” as a frustration or dejection of the matter of fact quality of our already
contingent being-in-the-world. He explicates our relationship to the temporality of our past, what
he calls the ontological quality of “that it is” through the revelation of thrownness through
attunement, “Dasein is always already brought before itself, it has always already found itself,
not as perceiving oneself to be there, but as one finds one’s self in attunement [emphasis
added]….Mood does not disclose in the mode of looking at thrownness, but as turning toward
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and away from it”94 Heidegger’s use of the spatial metaphors of “turning toward and away,”
along with the temporal aspect of Dasein as thrown, allows us to see mood, or as I appropriate it
for an understanding of affect, as an orientation in the world.
Rather than the aesthetic terminology of “perceiving” and “looking” problematized in
Charles’ view of the seascape in The Sea, The Sea, Heidegger articulates an experience of mood
as an anxious relation to the fact of always already being in a mood. The “turning toward and
away” that defines the disclosure of being as thrown in “attunement” asserts an understanding of
affect as “an existential, fundamental way in which Dasein is its there. It not only characterizes
Dasein ontologically, but is at the same time of fundamental methodological significance for the
existential analytic because of its disclosure.”95 Being in a mood, even in turning away from the
structure of Being itself, in “thrownness” discloses it as such. This framework intervenes in the
history of modern thought with an understanding the disclosure of Dasein in “thrownness”
through “attunement” as a contingent relationship of the self to the world, proposing that affects
themselves describe a self radically opposed to the therapeutic ethos of a modern subjectivity.
The narrator of memoir, having initially set out to look back from the present perspective,
eye to his past and to the simple seascape, after his own failure, expresses shame and regret in his
own retrospection. After the novel climaxes with Charles being pushed to his near death into a
chasm in the seaside cliffs near his home, his illusory quest falters. He writes in the section titled,
which I can’t help but read as camp, “Epilogue: Life Goes On…” that “Of course I do not
believe in those ‘blasphemies’ which I wrote earlier. …But would not forgiving her finally
defeat the purpose of this psychological game I have been playing with myself.”96 In a sense,
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Charles own writing has diagnosed his neurosis. His revelation, that “I accused Hartley of being
a ‘fantasist’…but what a ‘fantasist’ I have been myself”97 provides a certain closure in the final
self-conscious realization of his failures that serve as “blasphemies” of his own memoir. As
Nicol argues however, “[w]here modernist first-person retrospective narrative is typified by the
sense of proximity between author and narrator, in these novels, Murdoch subtly problematizes
her hero’s point of view.”98 The final redemptive sentiment of moral composure that allows
Charles to title all of his early writing as “History” expresses an ultimate irony of the novel, for it
also must be interpreted in its aspect as redacted into antimodernist staging.
The novel’s anti-modern attempt to circumscribe a subject through Murdoch’s elaborate
staging of Charles’ writing of the self also marks the failure of realism. The narrative reveals its
formal imposition as artifice through its uncanny plot and the anxiety that inflects the
retrospection. This staging, of plot and of Charles as subject, remains in conflict with the sense
that the seascape reveals an anxious ontological event of an affective tone that escapes the
novel’s mechanisms.
Charles’ has the odd experience of half-remembering his own near-death experience. After
going for a swim in the sea, he describes how he began to feel strange and then, recounting his
remembering, he writes, I remembered that, just before my head cracked against the rock and the
blackness came upon me, I had seen something else…The monstrous sea serpent had actually
been in the cauldron with me.99 This memory resurfaces through the staging of the uncanny that
takes place in The Sea, The Sea. However the sea serpent no longer warrants a rational
investigation, and Murdoch’s fiction instead points to the artifice of the memoir and its inability
to contain the involuntary emergence of anxiety. It was his swimming just prior that brought
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about his strange memory of the sea serpent. Charles recounts how “The cold shock, then the
warmth, then the strong gentle lifting motion of the quiet waves reminded me terribly of
happiness. I swam about feeling the loneliness of the sea and that particular sensation which I
now identified as a sense of death which it seemed to have always carried into my heart.”100 The
feeling of the waves evokes a memory of “happiness,” the failed sublime of the sea. That
evocation of the past anxiously anticipates the confluence of “loneliness” and “a sense of death.”
For Heidegger, the structure of “attunement” finds its most “authentic” expression in
anxiety: “In anxiety, Dasein finds itself faced with the nothingness of the possible impossibility
of its existence… Being-toward-death is essentially anxiety.”101 I am tempted to assert the
reflection of the Heideggerian concept of “being-towards-death” as it seems implied in Charles’
sense of ontological anxiety. At the same time, I am attentive to the disclaimer that the
philosopher packages with this theoretical insight. In Heidegger’s footnote to this explication he
writes—in a typical gesture to distinguish his terminology as part of an irreducible grammar—
that this anxiety he is describing is “certainly not anxiety as a mere emotion.”102 In Ningen
Shikkaku, anxiety as “disqualification” brings Yozo before himself in that fact of his inability to
write the stable subject of aesthetics. The sea for Dazai could only be apprehended through the
revelation of anxiety, as the suicidal disclosure of his individuation. However, as part of a novel,
the representation of anxiety in The Sea, The Sea seems to more easily fall into an analysis that
understands Charles’ “loneliness” and “particular sensation” of the “sense of death” as the mere
emotional projections of a complex and reflective character.
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This anxious swim serves as affective understanding of Charles’ unhappiness, and as an
uncanny impetus for Murdoch’s invocation of the other uncanny memory of the sea serpent.
More broadly both the uncanny and anxiety function in The Sea, The Sea as affect modes for
constructing a novelistic representation of selfhood that functions through a literary staging of
the retrospection. This staging of Charles’ retrospective failure never accedes to the
schizophrenic or fractured interventions into subjectivity that characterize Jameson’s
postmodernism, or evoke Terada’s “death of the subject.” The Sea, The Sea is postmodern in as
much as it is looking back on modernity, attempting to restore the anxieties of a neurotic modern
subjectivity. Where a psychoanalytic reading would be a conservative reading affirming a
therapeutic recovery of the anxious subject, I instead suggest that bringing Heidegger’s mood to
bear can reveal the strategies of subjection that comprise Murdoch’s text

Post-script
And the myth of myth, its truth, is that fiction is in effect, in this ontogony, inaugural. In sum,
fiction is the subject of being. Mimesis is the Poesis of the world as true world of gods, of men,
and of nature. The myth of myth is in no way an ontological fiction; it is nothing other than an
ontology of fiction or representation: it is therefore a particularly fulfilled and fulfilling form of
the ontology of subjectivity in general.
Jean-Luc Nancy, “Myth Interrupted” 55.
In this paper, the ideological construction of aesthetics and the theorization of affect are
understood through their inseparability in the defining the self. As the study of the subject’s
reflection judgment of the object that finds wellspring in Kant’s Critique of Judgment, the
conventions of the term aesthetic itself oppose the move to incorporate Heidegger’s ontology
into my analysis. Heidegger defines the self through the neological advent of Da-sein, literally
meaning Being-there. He explains that “in being in a mood, Da-sein is always already disclosed
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in accordance with its mood as that being to which Da-sein was deliver over in its being as the
being which it, existing, has to be.”103
In some ways I do not think I have truly done a “Heideggerian” reading of these literary
works. From the wake of modern literature neither the fictional memoir penned by Iris Murdoch
nor Dazai Osamu’s suicidal shishōsetsu seem the most exemplary choice of works to interpret
anxiety against an aesthetic organized by a psychoanalysis of the bourgeois subject. Even before
this interpretation of affect that finds origin in Heidegger’s concept of Attunement, these literary
works lack the qualities Heidegger describes in the Greek Temple, which “standing there, …The
steadfastness of the work contrasts with the surge of the surf, and its own repose bring out the
raging of the sea.”104 These literary works do not stand steadfast and in their anxious
constructions of the self and seem to resist that capacity to set up this primordial relationship.
Their realism of an anxious self contrasts with the realism that Heidegger reads in C.F. Meyer’s
poem as “truth put into the work.”105 The modern novel as an apparatus of subjection paints the
sea through the subjective perceptions, as a view or landscape in the narrative
However, inasmuch as the ontological fiction of an anxious subject finds its myth in the
techniques of the modern novel, there is the undercurrent of the anxious “turning towards and
away” that characterizes the form’s poetry as it struggles to apprehend the self. Indeed Ningen
Shikkaku has been treated distinctly from the novel-form in its inability to comprise anxiety as a
revelatory narrative uncanny.
The desire to let my feeling provoke my thinking serves as the impetus for this research. It
began with the confounding feelings I have at the Oregon Coast. Here, now, in Oberlin, Ohio
those feelings are the objects of intellection, of writing. In Jean-Luc Nancy’s words, with
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literature, “showing and revealing” takes place, “fictioning is the subject of being.”106 We find it
on the seashore, sitting on the sand or in amongst the prying dune grass. Rain comes down, the
driftwood damp, the horizons low, and the undergrowth strong as I think about the sea, I
remember it how, perhaps we can think of the aesthetic ideal of subject, “like a wave breaking on
a rock, giving up / Its shape in a gesture which expresses that shape.”107
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